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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case involves an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the 
Defendant, ZZYZX Management Group. Appellate jurisdiction is conferred by Article Vill 
§ 5 of the Utah Constitution, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated, and Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A notice of appeal was filed with the clerk of the trial 
court pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (See Notice of Appeal, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A;" R. 349). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for ZZYZX Management 
Group on the ground Neil Hone could not establish the elements of proximate cause of his 
injuries? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and. . . [when] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In addition, it is well established that the court, while reviewing 
a motion for summary judgment, must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, in this case, the Plaintiff. See Morris v. Farnsworth Motel. 259 P.2d 297 
(Utah 1953); Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. 
James Constructors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Supreme Court held: 
Summary Judgment can properly be granted under Rule 56(c) only if "the 
pleadings, depositions, and admission on file, together with the Affidavit, if 
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any," which are offered, show without dispute that the party is entitled to 
prevail. This condition is obviously not met if the allegations of the plaintiffs 
complaint stand in opposition to averments of the Affidavit so that there are 
controverted issues of fact. The determination of which are necessary to settle 
the rights of the parties. (Emphasis added). 
Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 377 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1963). Summary 
judgment is not used to determine facts or weigh testimony or creditability of witness. See 
Hill ex rel Fogel v. Grandsent. Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970); Sandberg v. Kline. 576 P.2d 
1291 (Utah 1978); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co.. 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 
1981); Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987). "It takes only 
one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy 
and create an issue of fact," precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). "Because disposition of a case by summary judgment denies the 
benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning question of fact, including evidence and 
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in favor of the party 
opposing the motion." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co.. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
"Furthermore, because negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from 
the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges, 'summary judgment is 
appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances.'" Nelson By and Through 
Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996) (quoting Dwiggins v. Morgan 
Jewelers. 811 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 1991)). Negligence "issues become questions of law only 
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when the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn from them." Silcox v. 
Skaggs Alpha Beta. Inc.. 814 p.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "Likewise the issue of 
proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury to determine in all but the clearest cases." 
Trujillo v. Utah Dep't Transp.. 986 P.2d 752, 764 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE AT TRIAL 
All four elements of negligence were argued on the trial level, and are therefore 
preserved for appeal. The deposition of one of ZZYZX's then employee and shift manager 
illustrates that ZZYZX had a duty to keep the sidewalk clear of harmful debris. "As each 
manager came in for their shift it was part of our daily walk-through to visually inspect the 
exterior walkways, pathways for cleanliness and things that might be of harm." (Excerpt 
from the deposition of Ryan McMillan, attached hereto as Exhibit UB;" page 9, lines 21-24, 
R. 112). The managers had been trained to inspect the sidewalks for hazards. This argument 
was raised by the Plaintiff and shows that ZZYZX understood it had a duty to keep the 
sidewalk free of hazards. See (R. 204). 
ZZYZX breached its duty by either failing to inspect the sidewalk on the day of the 
injury or by failing to remove the rocks. The same manager/employee mentioned above 
states that it was his responsibility to check the sidewalks on the day of the accident, but that 
he does not remember conducting the inspection. (Exhibit "B;" page 12, lines 12-16). As 
argued at trial, R. 203-04, ZZYZX had constructive knowledge of rocks on the sidewalk and 
therefore breached its duty by not removing the rocks. 
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The Plaintiff, Neil Hone, argued in the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Neil D. Hone's claims that enough evidence had been 
presented to establish that the rocks on the Defendant's sidewalk were the proximate cause 
of his fall and subsequent injuries. (R. 205-209). Therefore the issue of proximate cause was 
preserved during the trial. 
There is no dispute among the parties that Neil fell just before entering ZZYZX's 
restaurant. (See R. 14). The amount of damages caused by the injury has not yet been 
argued. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves Neil Hone's claim that ZZYZX's negligent maintenance of its rock 
landscaping and sidewalks resulted in his slipping and falling on rocks on ZZYZX's 
sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment for ZZYZX on the grounds that Neil 
could not establish that the rocks on the sidewalk were the proximate cause of his fall. Neil 
appeals. 
Neil asks this court to review and reverse the trial court's ruling on the ZZYZX's 
motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Chevy's Fresh Mex "the restaurant" is owned by the ZZYZX Management Group 
"ZZYZX." The restaurant has southwestern style architecture and landscaping around the 
entrance. (See Entrance Picture, attached hereto as Exhibit "C;" R. 114). Next to the 
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sidewalk by the entrance are landscaped areas full of "river rocks" and "pea gravel. (See 
Affidavit of Paula Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "D;" [^14; R. 302; and Exhibit "C;" and 
Interstitial Rocks Picture, attached hereto as Exhibit "E;" R. 289). Neil Hone was just about 
to enter Chevy's "the restaurant" when he slipped and fell on the sidewalk adjacent to an area 
landscaped with rocks. Neil does not remember much of the events during his fall. (Excerpt 
from the deposition of Neil Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "F;" page 28, lines 19-23 R. 
130). "[He] was up and then [he] was down." (Exhibit "F;" page 28, lines 19-23). Neil 
remembers his right foot slipping and states, "it felt like there was something . . . under it." 
(Exhibit "F;" page 27, lines 15-17). Neil's wife, Paula Hone, was standing two feet from 
Neil when he fell. (Excerpt from the deposition of Paula Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"G;" page 11, lines 5-10; R. 106). 
Paula described Neil's fall as "[i]t was like he had stumbled on something;' (Exhibit 
"G;" page 11, lines 25 and page 12, lines 1-4). Within a couple of minutes of Neil's fall, as 
Paula was helping Neil, he mentioned to Paula that he had felt there was something under 
his feet when he slipped. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 10-14). Paula began looking around 
and noticed small rocks on the sidewalk. (Exhibit "G;" page 15, lines 14-18 and page 18, 
lines 15-16.). Paula removed the small rocks from the area where Neil fell by brushing the 
rocks aside with her foot "out of concern that others might fall in a manner similar to my 
husband." (Exhibit "D;" ^ 5). Dustin confirmed his mother's testimony in his affidavit. "I 
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observed what appeared to be some pea gravel scattered on the sidewalk in the area where 
he fell." (Affidavit of Dustin Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "H;" %5; R. 285). 
A potential witness, Sara Lynn Howard, stated in her deposition that she saw Neil hit 
his head when he fell but did not notice his feet. (R. 119). Sara was an unspecified distance 
from Neil and came over after his fall. (R. 119). Sara and her friend went into the restaurant 
to have someone call an ambulance. (R. 118). Paula remembers a couple coming out of the 
restaurant at approximately the time she observed the rocks on the sidewalk. (Exhibit "G;" 
page 18, lines 19-22). It is unclear whether the couple Paula observed were present when 
Paula swept the rocks off the sidewalk to prevent someone else's injury. 
Ryan McMillan was the senior manager of the restaurant on duty at the time of the 
accident, f Excerpt from the deposition of Ryan McMillan, attached hereto as Exhibit "B;" 
page 12, lines 10-11; R. 112). Ryan had started his shift approximately an hour and half 
before Neil's fall. (Exhibit UB;" page 12, lines 18-19). Ryan stated in his deposition that 
"[a]s each manager came in for their shift it was part of our daily walk-through to visually 
inspect the exterior walkways, pathways for cleanliness and things that might be of harm." 
(Exhibit "B;" page 9, lines 21-24). As the senior manager it was Ryan's job to inspect the 
sidewalks. (Exhibit "B;" page 12, lines 12-14). However, Ryan cannot recall having 
inspected the sidewalks according to the requirements of company policy. (Exhibit "B;" 
page 12, lines 15-16). Ryan entered the premises from the rear not from the front entrance. 
(Exhibit "B;" page 9, lines 25 and page 10, lines 1-9). 
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Paula returned several times to the premises where Neil fell since his injury. (Exhibit 
"D;" 1J9). Paula stated in her affidavit that "[e]ach time I have returned I have observed 
rocks, pebbles, and other materials on the walkways." (Exhibit "D;" TflO). Paula has 
included pictures that illustrate how common it is for rocks from ZZYZX's landscaping to 
be on the sidewalks. (Continuous Rocks Pictures, attached hereto as Exhibit "I;" R. 295, 
296). Even the report by the engineering firm that studied the grade of the landscaping 
included a picture that showed landscaping rocks present on the sidewalk in the area where 
Neil fell. (Included in Exhibit "I;" R. 260). 
Neil dislocated both shoulders and compound fractured his left wrist. (Exhibit "F;" 
page 30, lines 20-22 and page 35, lines 2-4). Neil has incurred medical bills and was unable 
to work for five weeks and Paula was unable to work for two weeks as a result of his fall. 
(Exhibit ctF;" page 46, lines 12-15 and page 52, lines 20-23). Neil brought suit to recover 
damages for his injuries. Summary judgment was granted for ZZYZX on grounds that Neil 
did not establish that the rocks on the sidewalk were the proximate cause of his fall. (See 
Memorandum Decision of Trial Court, attached hereto as Exhibit "J;" R. 340). Neil appeals 
that decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment should not have been granted for ZZYZX. ZZYZX had a duty 
to exercise reasonable care in ensuring the safety of its customers on its sidewalks. ZZYZX 
breached this duty by creating a permanent hazard on its premises that injured Neil Hone. 
7 
ZZYZX installed rock landscaping adjacent to the sidewalk. The deposition of ZZYZX 
senior manager on duty at the time of the injury acknowledged that the sidewalks were 
supposed to be inspected at the start of each shift for "things that might be of harm." The 
ZZYZX senior manager who had the responsibility to inspect the sidewalks does not 
remember having done so when his shift started about an hour and a half before Neil's injury. 
ZZYZX was aware, or should have been aware, of the danger that loose rocks on a sidewalk 
can be to unsuspecting customers. The affidavits and reasonable inferences establish a 
genuine issue of material fact that ZZYZX created a foreseeable and inherently dangerous 
permanent hazard by failing to properly inspect the sidewalks around its rock landscaping. 
The affidavits and depositions of Neil and his wife Paula and their son Dustin clearly 
establish that rocks were present on the sidewalk when Neil fell. Neil felt something under 
his right foot before it slipped out from underneath him and he fell. Paula stated that Neil 
felt like he had stumbled on something. While Paula was helping Neil on the ground Neil 
mentioned that he had felt something under his foot. At that point Paula looked around and 
noticed the small rocks on the sidewalk. Dustin noticed the rocks on the ground also. This 
testimony presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the rocks were the cause 
of the fall. 
The affidavits and depositions of Neil, Paula, and Dustin provide a reasonable basis 
for the inference that the rocks were the proximate cause of Neil's fall. Summary judgment 
is appropriate only if there is no other reasonable conclusion that a jury could reach. Based 
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upon the description of how Neil fell, Neil's testimony that he felt something under his feet, 
and Paula and Dustin observing the rocks on the sidewalk were he fell, a jury could 
reasonably conclude that the rocks did in fact cause Neil to fall. Therefore the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment should be reversed on such a factually sensitive issue. 
ARGUMENT 
"A prima facie case of negligence requires a showing of: (1) a duty of reasonable care 
extending to the plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and actual causation of the 
injury; and (4) damages suffered by plaintiff." Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 
598, 600-01 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 
573 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985))). 
I. ZZYZX HAD A DUTY TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE IN THE 
MAINTENANCE OF ITS LANDSCAPING AND SIDEWALKS FOR ITS 
CUSTOMERS. 
The law is clear that a business owner "is charged with the duty to use reasonable care 
to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for his patrons." 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d476,478 (Utah 1996) (citing Preston v. Lamb. 
20 Utah 2d. 260,436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1968)). This duty of reasonable care also extends to 
a business owner's sidewalks. Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 
1977) ("defendant's employees had met their duty under the circumstance in making the 
sidewalk reasonably safe"). 
9 
It is undisputed that Neil Hone was ZZYZX's customer. He and his wife Paula and 
their son Dustin were preparing to enter Chevy's restaurant "the restaurant" in order to use 
coupons they had received when Neil slipped on some rocks and was injured. (Excerpt from 
the deposition of Neil Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "F;" page 18, line 25 and page 30, 
lines 20-22; R. 130). 
ZZYZX clearly had a duty to keep its sidewalks reasonably safe for customers like 
Neil. The trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate on the 
element of duty. 
II. ZZYZX'S BREACHED ITS DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE THROUGH ITS 
MAINTENANCE OF THE ROCK LANDSCAPING ADJACENT TO THE 
SIDEWALKS AND CREATED A FORESEEABLE AND INHERENTLY 
DANGEROUS SLIP HAZARD. 
There are two theories under which a customer can recover after an injury that 
resulted from a slip and fall due to a business owner's negligence. Merino v. Albertsons, 
Inc.. 1999 UT 14, }^4, 975 P.2d 467. The first theory applies to temporary hazards and has 
two requirements. Id at ]|5. "First, a plaintiff must show that the business owner knew or 
should have known of the hazardous condition. Second, a plaintiff must show that the 
business owner had enough time to remedy the unsafe condition had the owner exercise 
reasonable care, and that the owner failed to do so." Id at f 5. This theory applies in those 
cases where the foreign matter on the floor has been created by a customer or person other 
than the stores employees. 
The second theory applies to permanent hazards. Id at [^6. 
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Permanent hazards- involve some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such 
as: in the structure of a building, or a stairway, etc. or in equipment or 
machinery, or its manner of use, which was created or chosen by the defendant 
(or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such circumstances, where 
the defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed 
to know of the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary. 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975). 
Permanent hazards include a negligent defendant's "method of operation where it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous 
condition." Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc.. 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah App. 1992). 
"Foreseeability and inherent danger are key elements of a negligence action under the 
[permanent hazard] theory of liability." Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476, 
479 (Utah 1996). The law clearly establishes liability if a business owner negligently 
chooses a method of operation where it is reasonably foreseeable that inherently dangerous 
conditions will occur. 
A. The Rocks That Neil Slipped on Were a Permanent Hazard. 
Temporary hazards are treated as permanent hazards if they are caused by a permanent 
structure. 
Although it [involved] a temporary situation in that the fall was on some 
vegetable leaves in front of a produce counter, it also [came] within the second 
class of cases above referred to. It was pointed out that in [the defendant's] 
permanent structure the vegetable racks were slanted in such a way that it 
should have been anticipated that leaves would fall on the floor. 
Id at 177 (citing Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.. 186 Kan. 75,348 P.2d 1022, 
1029-30). There is no question that the rocks that Neil slipped upon were transitory in 
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nature. However, there is also no question that the rocks came from the landscaped area 
adjacent to the sidewalk. Paula Hone "Paula," the wife of Neil, stated in her affidavit that 
she went back to restaurant after Neil's fall and found small rocks interspersed between the 
larger rocks in the landscaped areas near were Neil fell. (Affidavit of Paula Hone, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "D;" f 14; R. 302). The only reasonable conclusion is that the rocks came 
from the landscaped area. And the landscaped area was clearly permanent. ZZYZX asserts 
in the answer to an interrogatory that the landscape was not altered for two years before 
Neil's injury. (R. 272). The rock landscaping was permanent. Neil's claim is based upon 
slipping upon rocks that could realistically only have come from the permanent landscaping. 
Neil's fall is clearly analogous to the plaintiffs fall in Maugeri, and therefore the Utah 
requirements for a permanent hazard, rather than a temporary hazard, apply. 
ZZYZX might argue that there were no rocks present on the sidewalk where Neil fell. 
There is abundant evidence that "pea gravel" was on the sidewalk when Neil fell. Neil's 
deposition alone infers that rocks must have been present when he fell. Neil remembers his 
right foot slipping and stated in his deposition that it "felt like there was something . . . under 
it." (Excerpt from the deposition of Neil Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "F;" page 27, lines 
15-17; R. 130). Neil does not remember any of the events during the fall itself because "[he] 
was up and then [he] was down." (Exhibit "F;" page 28, lines 19-23). Neil was in a lot of 
pain after dislocating both of his shoulders and compound fracturing his left wrist and did 
not look around to see the cause of his fall. (Exhibit "F;" page 30, lines 18-20 and page 32, 
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lines 1-6). Neil's deposition by itself infers that there must have been rocks or something 
similar on the sidewalk at the time he fell. However, the testimony of Neil's wife Paula, and 
their teenage son Dustin clearly establish that rocks were present on the sidewalk where Neil 
fell. 
Paula had been walking a foot or two from Neil when he fell. (Excerpt from the 
deposition of Paula Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "G;" page 11, lines 5-10; R. 106). She 
stated in her deposition that "[i]t was like he had stumbled on something" when Neil fell. 
(Exhibit "G;" page 11, line 25 and page 12, lines 1-4). Within a couple of minutes of Neil's 
fall, as Paula was helping Neil, he mentioned to Paula that he had felt there was something 
under his feet when he slipped. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 10-18). Paula began looking 
around and noticed small rocks on the sidewalk. (Exhibit "G;" page 15, lines 14-18 and page 
18, lines 15-16). Paula removed the small rocks from the area where Neil fell by brushing 
the rocks aside with her foot "out of concern that others might fall in a manner similar to my 
husband." (Exhibit "D;" |5). Dustin confirmed his mother's testimony in his affidavit. "I 
observed what appeared to be some pea gravel scattered on the sidewalk in the area where 
he fell." (Affidavit of Dustin Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "H;" P; R. 285). 
There is potentially conflicting testimony as to whether there were rocks present when 
Neil fell. A potential witness, Sara Lynn Howard "Sara," stated in her deposition that she 
saw Neil hit his head when he fell but did not notice his feet. (Excerpt from the deposition 
of Sara Lynn Howard, R. 119). Sara was an unspecified distance from Neil and came over 
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after his fall. (R. 119). She noted she did not see anything on the ground "except for the 
rocks in the landscaping area." (R. 119). Sara's testimony either conflicts with Neil, Paula, 
and Dustin's testimony or Paula had already swept the rocks off the sidewalk with her foot 
before Sara arrived. The fact that Sara said she did not see anything in the area only means 
that she was focused on the injured Neil Hone and did not observe anything. 
Paula stated that she observed the rocks and swept them off to prevent injury to other 
within two minutes of Neil's fall. (Exhibit uD;"^f5; Exhibit aG;" page 18, lines 15-18). She 
also stated in her deposition that by the time she observed the rocks there was a couple who 
had come out from the restaurant and an employee. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 19-22). 
Sara had a man with her and stated in her deposition that she and her friend went in and had 
the restaurant call an ambulance and then waited outside with the Hone's until the ambulance 
arrived. (R. 118). It is very possible that Sara and her friend were the couple that Paula 
referred to seeing come out of the restaurant. It is unclear from Sara's deposition whether 
she looked for what caused Neil to fall before or after going into the restaurant to call an 
ambulance. It is possible that Paula noticed the rocks and swept them aside before Sara 
returned from the restaurant. Therefore, it is unclear at this point whether there is a conflict 
in testimony or not. However, this is a genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide. 
The testimony of Paul and Neil alone created a fact issue precluding summary judgment. 
For the purpose of summary judgment the trial court should have acknowledged the 
factual issue that the rocks were present upon the sidewalk for two reasons. First, all 
14 
evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to Neil, the non-moving party. There 
is potentially no conflict between the testifying parties. Therefore, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to Neil this Court should conclude there is no conflict of testimony 
and the rocks were present on the sidewalk. Second, summary judgment cannot be based 
upon a disputed fact. If the evidence is viewed to be in conflict then there is a conflict over 
a material fact. Given the central importance of the issue of whether rocks were present, for 
the purposes of summary judgment, the affidavits and depositions of the non-moving party 
establish facts true and this Court should analyze on the basis that the rocks were present of 
ZZYZX's sidewalk when Neil fell. 
B. It Was Foreseeable That Rocks from the Landscaping Would Need to Be 
Routinely Removed from the Sidewalks to Prevent a Slip Hazard. 
1. Foreseeability is established because ZZYZX was aware of the risk of 
someone slipping on the rocks and falling. Ryan McMillan was the senior manager of the 
restaurant on duty at the time of the accident. (Excerpt from the deposition of Ryan 
McMillan, attached hereto as Exhibit "B;" page 12, lines 10-12; R. 112). Ryan McMillan 
stated in his deposition that "[a]s each manager came in for their shift it was part of our daily 
walk-through to visually inspect the exterior walkways, pathways for cleanliness and things 
that might be of harm." (Exhibit "B;" page 9, lines 21-24). This statement establishes that 
the ZZYZX had trained its managers of the risk that someone might slip and fall on the 
sidewalks if the sidewalks were not properly maintained. Ryan McMillan's statement 
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distinguishes between inspecting for cleanliness and inspecting for "things that might be of 
harm." 
It is reasonable to infer that rocks on the sidewalk were a source of perceived harm. 
There is no dispute that the landscape contained rocks. ZZYZX has supplied pictures that 
show the rocky landscape around the sidewalk where Neil fell. (Continuous Rocks Pictures, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "I;" R. 260). Neil has supplied pictures illustrating the thousands 
of little rocks, "pea gravel" that lie between the larger rocks adjacent to the sidewalk where 
Neil fell. (Interstitial Rocks Picture, attached hereto as Exhibit "E;" R. 289). There is no 
question that there are a multitude of rocks in the area where Neil's injury occurred. 
Realistically, there are only two main sources of harm on ZZYZX 's sidewalk: debris 
dropped from customers and rocks from the landscaping winding up on the sidewalk. It 
would be very difficult to construe Ryan McMillan's knowledge that managers were 
supposed to inspect for "things that might be of harm" to only being limited to garbage 
dropped by customers. Given that difficulty, the evidence indicates that ZZYZX's was aware 
that customers might slip and fall on rocks from the landscaping if the sidewalk was not 
periodically maintained and establishes foreseeability. At a bare minimum, it can be 
postulated that reasonable minds could differ as to whether ZZYZX was aware of the risk 
of slipping from pea gravel or rocks on the sidewalk and therefore foreseeability is a question 
for the jury. However, the most reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that ZZYZX was 
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aware of the risk of customers slipping on pea gravel or rocks on the sidewalk. Therefore, 
reasonable foreseeability is established. 
2. Reasonable foreseeability is established even if ZZYZX did not have 
actual knowledge of the risk, because ZZYZX had constructive knowledge of the risk. 
Common sense dictates that as a matter of course some of the rocks and pea gravel used in 
landscaping will wind up on an adjacent side walk. It does not matter whether the rocks were 
moved by children or employees or any other unknown cause. Human traffic along a 
sidewalk extensively lined with rocks and gravel will naturally result in some rocks being 
scattered upon the sidewalk. Constructive knowledge is established because even if ZZYZX 
was not aware of the possibility that rocks from the landscaping could be on the sidewalk, 
ZZYZX should have been aware. Based upon this natural inference alone a jury could 
reasonably decide that rocks on the sidewalk was a foreseeable event. 
3. Reasonable foreseeability is supported by the fact that rocks continue 
to wind up on ZZYZX's sidewalk. The continuing presence of rocks on the sidewalk 
supports the inference that ZZYZX's landscaping rocks wind up on the sidewalk as a matter 
of course. Neil's wife Paula has returned several times to the premises where Neil fell since 
his injury. (Exhibit "D;" ]f9). Paula stated in her affidavit that "[e]ach time I have returned 
I have observed rocks, pebbles, and other materials on the walkways." (Exhibit "D;" ]flO). 
Paula has included seven pictures that illustrate how common it is for rocks from ZZYZX's 
landscaping to be on the sidewalks. (Exhibit "I;" R. 295, 296). Even the report by the 
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engineering firm that studied the grade of the landscaping included a picture that showed 
landscaping rocks present on the sidewalk in the area where Neil fell. (Exhibit "I;" R. 260). 
The affidavit and pictures of Paula and the picture provided by the engineering firm support 
the natural inference that the combination of people and rock landscaping will result in rocks 
on the sidewalks. There is more than enough grounds for a jury to reasonably conclude that 
it is foreseeable that landscaping rocks will wind up on an adjacent sidewalk. 
ZZYZX might argue that the affidavit and pictures supplied by Paula as well as the 
picture supplied by the engineering firm ZZYZX hired cannot be admitted as evidence 
showing the reasonableness of the inference that ZZYZX's landscaping rocks will naturally 
wind up on the adjacent sidewalks. The Utah Supreme Court had the opportunity to reject 
this type of evidence and chose not. In Merino, 1999 UT 14, |^7, the plaintiff had slipped and 
fallen twice in the defendant's grocery store. The plaintiff hired an investigator who visited 
the store nine times over two years, Id The court did not declare the evidence inadmissible. 
The court allowed the evidence but determined that the evidence did not "establish a 
permanently unsafe condition at the time of either accident" Li 
It could be deductively argued that since nine visits did not establish a "permanently 
unsafe condition" then the several visits by Paula and the engineering firm does not establish 
foreseeability, because foreseeability is an element of permanent hazards. However, the 
evidence in the present case is being used for a clearly different reason than the evidence was 
used in Merino. The plaintiff in Merino attempted to show a pattern of fruit and vegetable 
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debris that established a continuing hazard at the defendant's store. The court noted that 
there was "no testimony that the floor was permanently covered with fruit or vegetable 
debris" and therefore determined that the evidence did not establish a permanent hazard at 
the time of the injury. Id. 
The present case is clearly distinguishable. In Merino, fruits and vegetables were 
transported by employees across the defendant's floor on probably a daily basis. Customers 
were at the defendant's store to buy the fruits and vegetables. If a fruit or vegetable fell on 
the floor it was a temporary hazard. The plaintiff tried to use nine visits over two years to 
show that the frequency with which fruit and vegetables had been dropped on the floor meant 
that the hazard crossed over from a temporary one to a permanent one. The court determined 
that this evidence did not establish a permanent hazard at the time of the falls. 
In contrast, ZZYZX's landscaping was clearly permanent. ZZYZX asserts in the 
answer to an interrogatory that the landscape was not altered for two years before Neil's 
injury. (R. 272). Paula's affidavit and pictures in conjunction with the engineering firm's 
picture provide evidence that supports the inference that landscaping will naturally tend to 
wind up on the sidewalk. This is clearly more than just trying to establish a pattern. 
Therefore the affidavit and pictures are admissible and support the natural inference that 
rocks from ZZYZX's permanent landscaping will foreseeably wind up on the sidewalk. 
However, even if there were no pictures or an affidavit indicating how common it is for 
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ZZYZX's landscaping rocks to get on the sidewalk, reasonable foreseeability is still 
established by the deposition of ZZYZX's employee and reasonable inference. 
4. The evidence on foreseeability clearly precludes summary judgment. 
As noted in the Standard of Review, "[i]t takes only one sworn statement under oath to 
dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact/' 
precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
The deposition of ZZYZX's employee clearly evinces that ZZYZX foresaw the hazard that 
would result if employees failed to inspect the sidewalks. Common knowledge provides an 
inference that rock landscaping will naturally result in rocks winding up on ZZYZX's 
sidewalk. The pictures and affidavit provide a further basis beyond common experience for 
support of that inference. Neil has supplied more than enough evidence to survive summary 
judgment. A jury should decide whether the risk created by loose rocks from the landscaped 
areas was reasonably foreseeable. Next, is the element of inherent danger. 
C. ZZYZX's Failure to Follow Company Policy and Appropriately Inspect 
the Sidewalks for Landscaping Rocks Created an Inherent Danger to 
Customers. 
1. ZZYZX's concern that a customer would be harmed if the sidewalks 
were not inspected every shift demonstrates that rocks on the sidewalk were an inherent 
danger. Inherent danger can be established by the defendants knowledge of the danger. 
Campbell v. Safewav Stores. Inc.. 15 Utah 2d. 113, 115, 388 P.2d 409, 410 (1964), (the 
unreasonable risk of harm to a customer from a cardboard box was established by the 
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manager who urged his employees to keep the aisle clear of boxes out of safety concerns). 
It was established in the previous section that ZZYZX's managers were supposed to inspect 
the sidewalks at the start of every shift for "things that might be of harm." Ryan McMillan 
stated that he could not recall having inspected the sidewalks on the day of the injury. It was 
also established previously that rocks on the sidewalk were likely a large portion of what 
ZZYZX considered "things that might be of harm." Therefore, because ZZYZX was aware 
of the harm that might occur if someone slipped on landscaping rocks on the sidewalk and 
failed to inspect the sidewalks then an inherent danger was established. 
2. A jury could reasonably conclude, even if ZZYZX did not have prior 
knowledge of the danger, that slipping and falling on rocks is inherently dangerous. Inherent 
danger is determined by the amount of harm that naturally results from an activity. Common 
experience teaches that slipping and falling can be dangerous. Additionally, if tripping on 
a cardboard box, Campbell qualifies as inherently dangerous then so do rocks on a sidewalk, 
because the harm that results from the fall is the same. Therefore a jury could reasonably 
conclude that slipping on the rocks on the sidewalk was an inherent danger. 
3. The inherent danger could have been mitigated by management 
compliance with the company policy. Company policy required the senior manager at the 
beginning of each shift to inspect the sidewalks for "things that might be of harm." (Exhibit 
"B;" page 9, lines 21 -24). In his deposition, the senior manager at the time, Ryan McMillan 
stated that he could not recall having inspected the sidewalks when his shift began at 3:30. 
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(Exhibit "B;" page 12,lines 15-16). The depositions of Neil and Paula both indicate that the 
time of the accident was around 5:00 p.m., approximately an hour and a half after the 
inspection should have occurred. (Exhibit "F;" page 22, line 15; Exhibit UG;" page 8, lines 
22-25). It is highly likely that if the sidewalks had been properly inspected according to 
company policy that the rocks would have been removed from the sidewalk and Neil would 
not have been injured. 
4. The evidence that landscaping rocks on a ZZYZX's sidewalk was 
clearly inherently dangerous precludes summary judgment. ZZYZX's awareness that if the 
sidewalk was not maintained by routine inspection illustrates that rocks on a sidewalk are an 
inherent danger. There is no question that the rocks must have come from the permanent 
landscaping adjacent to the sidewalk. Common sense dictates that rocks on a side walk can 
be a trip hazard and represent an inlierent danger. ZZYZX's manager responsible for 
inspecting the sidewalks before Neil's arrival cannot recall having conducted the inspection. 
A proper inspection would have facilitated removal of the hazardous rocks and could have 
prevented Neil's injury. At a bare minimum, it is a question for the jury to decide if the rocks 
represented an inlierent danger and whether or not ZZYZX should have conducted an 
inspection according to company policy. 
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were rocks present on the 
sidewalk when Neil fell. The permanent rock landscaping created a permanent risk of 
customers slipping on landscaping rocks that naturally end up on the adjacent sidewalks. It 
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was clearly foreseeable that if ZZYZX did not keep the landscaping rocks off of the sidewalk 
that a customer might slip and fall and be seriously injured. The failure to follow company 
policy and properly inspect the sidewalks created an inherent danger to customers. At a bare 
minimum, enough evidence has been presented to survive summary judgment. The trial 
court correctly concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate for the element of 
breach of duty. 
III. THERE IS ENOUGH EVIDENCE THAT THE ROCKS ON THE SIDEWALK 
WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF NEIL'S INJURIES TO PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court concluded that "[n]o evidence has been presented that the rocks were 
the cause of the fair' and summary judgment for ZZYZX was granted. (Memorandum 
Decision of Trial Court, attached hereto as Exhibit "J;" R. 340). There is substantial 
evidence that the rocks caused Neil's fall and therefore summary judgment should not have 
been granted. 
A* NeiPs Evidence That the Rocks Caused His Fall Is Not Speculative and 
Therefore a Jury Decides Whether Proximate Cause Has Been 
Established. 
In determining proximate cause, unless the evidence is speculative, a jury decides 
whether a cause is proximate or not. Utah law is that "[s]ome or all of the links [of 
proximate cause] may depend upon inferences." Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 
44, 132 P.2d 680, 682 (1943). "Furthermore, because negligence cases often require the 
drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges, 
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'summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances.'55 
Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568,571 (Utah 1996) (quoting 
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182,183 (Utah 1991)). However, if "the proximate 
cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of law." Sumsion, 
132 P.2d at 683 (quoting Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80, 84 
(1917)). When causation "remains one ofpure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities 
are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the 
defendant." Nelson By and Through Stuckman, 919 P.2d at 574 (citing W. Page Keeton et 
al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984), quoted in Weber v. 
Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1367 (Utah 1986)). Proximate cause can clearly be 
established by inference but speculation will not survive summary judgment. Inference and 
speculation have been specifically defined. 
"An inference is a deduction as to the existence of a fact which human experience 
teaches us can reasonably and logically be drawn from proof of other facts." State v. Hester, 
3 P.3d 725, 730 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Manchester v. Dugan, 247 A.2d 827, 829 
(Me. 1968)). "Speculation is defined as the 'act or practice of theorizing about matters over 
which there is no certain knowledge.'" Id (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed. 
1999)). "In reality, there is no black line between inference and speculation - both are way-
stations along a continuum that has absolute certainty at one extreme and complete 
impossibility at the other." Id Utah case law has placed markers along the inference-
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speculation continuum that differentiates inference and speculation. The negligence cases 
cited do not necessarily deal specifically with inferences to proximate cause but illustrate the 
differences between an inference and speculation. 
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), illustrates that 
inferential evidence can be obtained primarily from a witness, and that the evidence does not 
have to be observed prior to the accident. The case also provides a factual comparison for 
acceptable inferences. The plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment in her slip and 
fall case claiming there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the store was 
responsible for the water on the floor that caused her fall. Id at 624. 
The facts are that the plaintiff slipped and fell on the floor of a dry goods aisle in the 
defendant's store, Id Neither the plaintiff nor the friend with her saw anything prior to the 
plaintiffs fall that would have caused the accident. Id However, when the friend went to 
help the plaintiff up she noticed the floor was wet. Id The friend later noticed after the 
plaintiff had been removed from the area that a cart used to transport stock items was located 
approximately 115 feet away and contained bags of melting ice. Id The cart was not of the 
type used by customers and there was spots of water leading from the cart to the place were 
the plaintiff fell. Id The court determined that "[a]n inference could be readily drawn by 
the jury that the water in which plaintiff fell came from the bags of ice on the cart left in the 
aisle by store employees." Id at 624-25. The court noted that it was for a jury to decide, 
even if only based upon an inference, whether a store employee moved the stock cart and was 
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therefore responsible for the injury or a "phantom shopper." Id at 625. Therefore, the lower 
court's grant of summary judgment was reversed. Id. 
Silcox illustrates that inferential evidence can be obtained from a witness to a slip and 
fall rather than from the plaintiff directly. 814 P.2d at 624. This Court reversed summary 
judgment relying almost solely upon the deposition and affidavit of the friend of the plaintiff. 
Id. The friend of the plaintiff noticed the wetness, the trail of puddles, and the cart with the 
bags of melting ice fall. Id The only evidence the court relied upon from the plaintiff was 
that she did not see anything on the floor before she fell. Id Therefore, direct and inferential 
evidence does not have to be supplied by the Plaintiff but can be supplied by witnesses. 
The second insight from Silcox is that inferential evidence about the cause of a fall 
does not have to be identified before the fall occurs. The friend of the plaintiff did not notice 
the floor was wet until she reached down to assist the plaintiff and the cart was not even 
noticed until after the plaintiff had been removed from the scene. Id Even though time is 
very important when the critical evidence is ice, this court concluded that the evidence 
discovered after the fall should not be denied from a jury. Id at 624 & 625. 
Silcox also provides a reference point for what evidence is a reasonable inference and 
what is speculative. Based upon the fact that the cart containing the leaking ice was the type 
customarily used by employees rather than the type typically used by customers, this court 
reasoned that a jury could "readily" conclude that the cart was left in the aisle by store 
employees rather than by someone else. Id at 625. It is also noteworthy that the court 
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accepted as a matter of course the inference that the water caused the plaintiff to fall when 
there was no direct evidence by the plaintiff that the water caused her fall. Id at 624. 
However, apparently that particular issue was not in dispute. 
Nelson By and Through Stuckman demonstrates that the existence of alternative 
theories of causation does not preclude presenting the evidence to the jury and also provides 
a model for acceptable inferences. In that case, a mother appealed summary judgment for 
the defendants in a suit on behalf of her four-year-old son against Salt Lake City and the 
State of Utah. 919 P.2d at 570. The mother claimed that either the city or the state was 
negligent in its failure to repair a breach in the four-foot fence around a park and that the 
breach in the fence was the proximate cause of her son's injury in the Jordan River. Id at 
570-71. 
The facts show there were no witnesses that saw the boy pass through the breach in 
the fence to gain access to the river. l± at 574. The defendants claimed the boy could have 
climbed the four-foot fence or gained access through some other opening in the fence. Id 
Despite the other possibilities and the lack of direct evidence, the court noted that "other 
evidence may be sufficient for a jury to find that it was 'more likely than not5 that [the boy] 
entered through the breach in the fence." Id The court never explained what the "other 
evidence" was. 
The court concluded that the determination of whether the breach in the fence was the 
proximate cause of the boy's injuries is a factual determination "appropriately left to the 
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jury" and the grant of summary judgment should be reversed. Id The Supreme Court 
decided that even though the boy could have climbed the four-foot fence or gained access 
to river by some other opening there was enough "other evidence" that a jury could 
reasonably conclude that more likely than not the boy entered the river through the breach. 
Nelson By and Through Stuckman, 919 P.2d at 574. Clearly, alternative theories do not 
preclude sending the options to a jury. 
In Campbell v. Safewav Stores. Inc., 15 Utah2d. 113,114,388 P.2d409,409 (1964), 
the plaintiff tripped over an empty cardboard box. The plaintiff appealed the trial court's 
grant of the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id The box was 
six inches tall, a foot wide, and a foot and a half long. Id at 115, 338 P.2d at 410. Canned 
goods normally come in that type of box and then clerks remove the cans from the box and 
place them upon the shelves. kL The jury could infer and "reasonably believe that there was 
a greater probability that store employees left the box where it was than that a customer or 
stranger did." Id, 338 P.2d at 410-11. Therefore, the judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
was set aside. Id at 117, 338 P.2d at 412. 
Campbell provides a reference point for reasonable inferences. The Supreme Court 
held that a jury could reasonably conclude that there was a greater possibility that the canned 
goods box was left in the aisle by an employee rather than a customer. Campbell 15 Utah 
2d. at 115, 388 P.2d at 410-11. 
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Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc., 775 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) provides a 
gauge for when evidence falls within the range of speculation. The plaintiff slipped and fell 
just inside the entrance of a mall and appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
for the defendant. Id. at 445. The plaintiff did not know what caused her to fall. IcL at 447. 
The plaintiff stated the floor was "nice, shiny, [and] clean" and was not wet. Id The 
plaintiff did not examine the floor after the accident, and no one with the plaintiff ever 
suggested to the plaintiff a reason for her fall. Id The plaintiff did not step on a "pebble or 
a grape or anything like that on the floor." IcL Therefore, the court concluded that the 
plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact. LI 
The Dybowski court stated there was "nothing in the record" to support a negligence 
claim. Id at 446. The above mentioned facts were taken from the plaintiffs deposition and 
illustrated the lack of evidence. ]d at 446-447. Clearly, a claim is speculative if there is no 
basis for which it is conceivable to construe the elements of negligence. 
Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co.. 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 477 (1955), also provides a 
benchmark for speculation. The plaintiff slipped on water in a restaurant and appealed the 
equivalent of a grant of summary judgment for the defendant. Id at 364-365, 284 P.2d 478. 
A waitress had brought the plaintiff water, but there was no evidence to indicate whether the 
water had been spilled by the waitress, the plaintiff or her companion, or some other patron. 
Id. "Under such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to speculate." Id Therefore, 
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evidence is speculative if there is no way a jury could conclude which of the several 
possibilities was more likely than the others. 
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith. Inc.. 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943), also provides a 
reference for when evidence is speculative. The plaintiff sued the tow-truck driver who was 
pulling his car claiming the defendant's failure to signal with his arm before pulling into the 
flow of traffic proximately caused a coal truck to rear-end the defendant and cause 
substantial damage to the plaintiffs car. Id at 682. The plaintiff appealed the trial court's 
grant of non-suit. IdL 
The facts are that the tow truck entered traffic from the parking lane at a "very gradual 
angle and at a very slow speed." Id at 683. The tow truck had traveled thirty-five to forty 
feet when the coal truck struck the plaintiffs towed vehicle. Id The only eye witness states 
that when the coal truck was twenty to thirty feet from the plaintiffs towed car that the coal 
truck swerved and then skidded on the icy road into the plaintiffs car. Id at 682. The court 
notes that by this point the tow truck would only have been two feet into the lane of traffic. 
Id at 683. 
The plaintiff urged that the coal truck skidded because the coal truck driver had not 
seen that the tow truck had pulled out in front of it and that the defendant's failure to signal 
was the cause of the other driver's lack of notice. Id The court noted that if the coal truck 
driver had not seen the tow truck he likely would not have seen an arm signal Id The court 
noted other possibilities were that the coal truck driver did see the tow tmck but proceeded 
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anyway or went into a skid because of other traffic conditions unrelated to the tow truck. Id 
The court concluded that because the other possible explanations for the accident were either 
equal or greater in probability than the explanation alleged by the plaintiffs that proximate 
cause had not been established. Id 
It is important to note that critical to the court's decision was the failure by the 
plaintiffs to inspect the accident site for any tracks, markings, or other observations that 
might have clarified the cause of the coal truck's skid. Id at 682. The court adds that the 
witness was never questioned as to what he thought the cause of the skid was, and no 
attempts were made to refute alternative explanations. Id Therefore there was only "very 
meager" evidence relating to proximate cause. Id 
The lack of evidence relating to proximate cause should not be construed as the court 
placing a high standard on evidence that qualified to go to the jury. Based upon the affidavit 
of the plaintiffs wife that the tow truck driver's window was rolled up and that she did not 
see him signal, the court noted that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the 
question of whether the defendant ever signaled. Id This comports with the inference case 
law cited above that if a jury could conclude from conflicting testimony that a fact was more 
likely than not true then it was properly submitted to the jury. Therefore, Sumsion illustrates 
similarly to Lindsay that if causation theories are at best equal in probability then the 
evidence is only speculative. 
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Summarizing the guidelines gleaned from the case law, Silcox provides that 
inferential evidence can be obtained primarily from a witness, and that the evidence does not 
have to be observed prior to the accident. Nelson By and Through Stuckman and Campbell 
illustrate that an inference is valid even if there are competing theories of causation. Lindsay 
and Sumsion point out that an inference is only speculation if at best it is equal in probability 
to the other theories of causation. Dybowski indicates that evidence is speculative if there 
is an utter lack of basis for determining causation. 
In the present matter, it is reasonably inferred that the rocks on ZZYZX's sidewalk 
caused Neil to fall and sustain injuries and therefore the grant of summary judgment should 
be reversed. First, is an application of the rules illustrated by the case law for differentiating 
between inference and speculation and then second a comparison between the facts of the 
present case with the facts of the cited cases. 
First is a comparison between Silcox and the present matter. Paula declared that she 
believed the rocks were the cause of Neil's fall. (Excerpt from the deposition of Paula Hone, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "G;" page 15, lines 14-18; R. 106). She stated that from the way 
that he fell she thought "he had stumbled on something." (Exhibit UG;" page 11, line 25 and 
page 12, lines 1 -4). Paula was told by Neil while he was laying on the ground that he had felt 
something under his feet when he fell. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 10-14). Within two 
minutes of Neil's fall, Paula looked around for what he had fallen on and noticed the small 
rocks. (Exhibit "G;" page 18, lines 15-18 and page 15, lines 14-18). The witness in Silcox 
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did not observe the water on the floor until after the plaintiff had fallen and the trail of 
puddles and the cart with the melting ice were not observed until after the plaintiff had been 
removed from the area. 
The Defendant has asserted that Paula's testimony is speculative because Paula did 
not see the rocks before Neil fell and because Paula did not see Neil's feet actually slipping 
on the rocks. (R. 138). Silcox clearly demonstrate that a witness's testimony is not 
speculative simply because it is based upon facts observed after the accident. Paula's two 
minutes is a much shorter time than it took for the witness in Silcox to discover the cart with 
the melting ice. This Court determined that the discovery of the trail of puddles and the cart 
with the melting ice were facts that should be presented to a jury. Clearly, Paula's discovery 
of the rocks after Neil's fall is a fact that should be presented to a jury. 
There is an additional comparison to Silcox. Neil did not know while he was falling 
what caused him to fall. (Excerpt from the deposition of Neil Hone, attached hereto as 
Exhibit "F;" page 28, lines 19-23; R. 130). Similarly, the plaintiff in Silcox did not see the 
water before she slipped. Neil stated in his deposition that he felt his right foot slip and it "if 
felt like there was something . . . under it." (Exhibit "F;" page 27, lines 15-17). It was not 
mentioned in Silcox what the plaintiff felt when she started to slip. It was assumed that if 
there was water where she fell that the water was the cause of the fall. Clearly, the presence 
of rocks is enough to infer that the rocks are the proximate cause of Neil's fall. 
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Dustin also stated in his affidavit that he saw "pea gravel" on the sidewalk where his 
father fell. (Affidavit of Dustin Hone, attached hereto as Exhibit "H:" p: R. 285). There 
were no additional witnesses in Silcox. This further bolsters the argument that a jury should 
hear the evidence in this case. 
In Nelson By and Through Stuckman. the Supreme Court decided that even though 
the boy could have climbed the four-foot fence or gained access to river by some other 
opening there was enough "other evidence" that a jury could reasonably conclude that more 
likely than not the boy entered the river through the breach. Nelson By and Through 
Stuckman, 919 P.2d at 574. Despite the lack of witnesses, the court concluded that the 
determination of whether the breach in the fence was the proximate cause of the boy's 
injuries is a factual determination "appropriately left to the jury" and the grant of summary 
judgment should be reversed. Id The court never explained what the "other evidence," but 
apparently it was potentially more reasonable for the boy to have accessed the river via the 
breach in the fence rather than by some other means. 
There is substantially more evidence connecting the rocks to the cause of Neil's fall 
than there was evidence connecting the boy to the breach in the fence. In Nelson By and 
Through Stuckman no witness saw how the boy crossed the fence. A jury would have to rely 
upon which alternative seemed most realistic for a four-year old. Paula saw her husband fall 
like he had stumbled on something. (Exhibit "G;" page 11, line 25 and page 12, lines 1-4). 
Paula and Dustin both observed the rocks. (Exhibit "G;" page 15, lines 14-18 and Exhibit 
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"H;" «[[5) Neil states he felt something under right foot when he started to fall. (Exhibit "F;" 
page 27, lines 15-17). The reasonable explanation is that Neil slipped on the rocks. 
Compared to the evidence in Nelson By and Through Stuckman, there is no question that a 
jury should decide if the rocks were the proximate cause of the injury and the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
Similarly, a comparison to Campbell illustrates that there is no question that summary 
judgment should be reversed. The critical piece of evidence in Campbell was that the box 
that the plaintiff tripped on was a kind normally moved by store employees when stocking 
the shelves. Based upon that evidence the Utah Supreme Court decided that a reasonable 
jury could conclude that it was more likely the box was left by an employee rather than a 
customer. In the present case Neil unknowingly stepped upon rocks and then slipped. It is 
very reasonable that a person who steps on rocks and then falls slipped because of the rocks. 
The probability that the rocks caused Neil's fall is greater than the probability that an 
employee left the cardboard box in the aisle of Campbell. If the Utah Supreme Court left 
Campbell in the hands of the jury, then the question of proximate cause in this case should 
clearly be decided by a jury. 
It could be argued that there are alternative theories of equal probability that preclude 
sending this case to the jury. For example, maybe Neil falls down sometimes for no reason 
due to his artificial knee and hip. Therefore, Neil could have stepped on the rocks and fallen 
not due to the rocks. However, Neil has affirmatively rebutted the alternative theory that he 
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fell down due to his artificial hip and knee. Neil was asked in his deposition whether his 
artificial hip or knee ever caused him to lose his balance. (Exhibit "F;" page 21, lines 3-5). 
Neil responded that they had not. (Exhibit "F;" page 21, lines 6-25). Viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to Neil, the non-moving party, the alternative theory that Neil fell 
because of his artificial joints has been rebutted. 
This differentiates the present case from Lindsay. In Lindsay, the plaintiff slipped on 
water that could have been spilled by the waitress or by the plaintiff or her companion. There 
was no way to determine who had spilled the water, and so it was an unreasonable inference 
that the waitress spilled the water and therefore speculative. The question at hand is whether 
it can be inferred that Neil fell because he slipped on rocks on the sidewalk or from some 
other cause. Paula saw her husband fall like he had stumbled on something. (Exhibit "G;" 
page 11, line 25 and page 12, lines 1-4). Paula and Dustin both observed the rocks. (Exhibit 
"G;" page 15, lines 14-18 and Exhibit "H;" ]J5). Neil remembers his right foot slipping and 
states, "if felt like there was something . . . under it." (Exhibit "F;" page 27, lines 15-17). 
Considering the possibilities, no other theory is as plausible as Neil's claim that he slipped 
on the rocks. And as discussed above, the chief alternative theory was rebutted in Neil's 
deposition. Therefore, Lindsay does not apply to the present matter because a jury could 
reasonably conclude that more likely than not the rocks caused Neil to fall. 
The ZZYZX has argued that because Neil did not directly assert that the rocks caused 
his fall that therefore Dybowski applies and all of the evidence is speculative. However, 
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there are substantial differences between the present case and Dybowski. First, the plaintiff 
in Dybowski repeatedly answered in her deposition that she did not know what caused her 
to fall, and had no basis from which she could infer what caused her fall. Dybowski, 775 
P.2d at 447. Second, none of the witnesses knew why the plaintiff in Dybowski had fallen. 
Id. Neil noted in his deposition that after he fell he was in a lot of pain and did not look 
around to see what caused his fall. (Exhibit "F;" page 30, lines 18-20 and page 32, lines 1-6). 
ZZYZX has endeavored to show that Neil's personal lack of direct knowledge at the time he 
fell puts him in the same category as Dybowski. 
As already discussed above, Neil did feel his right foot slip when he started to fall and 
remembers feeling something underneath it. Paula and Dustin both observed rocks on the 
sidewalk where Neil fell. Paula believes the rocks caused Neil to fall. Paula saw Neil fall 
like he had stumbled on something. Neil's stated to Paula right after the fall that he felt 
something under his feet when his right foot slipped. After Neil's comment to her, Paula 
began looking around and observed the rocks. The only reasonable explanation is that the 
rocks caused Neil to fall. There is clearly a basis for determining causation and therefore 
Dybowski does not apply. 
The evidence of causation also separates this case from Sumsion. The Sumsion court 
determined that the probabilities were at best equal because of the "meager" evidence 
regarding causation. The witness in Sumsion was not asked what he thought caused the 
accident and no investigations were made to determine how the accident occurred. There is 
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clearly substantial evidence that the rocks were the cause of Neil's fall. Paula believes based 
upon her observations that the rocks caused Neil's fall. The evidence is nearly undisputable 
that the rocks caused Neil's fall. 
Neil's case is founded upon solid affidavits, depositions, and reasonable inferences. 
Neil's claim that the rocks caused him to slip and fall is not speculative, but is the only 
reasonable interpretation of the events. At a bare minimum, the question of proximate cause 
is a question for the jury. Summary judgment was not appropriate in this case. 
B. Granting Summary Judgment Would Require Weighing the Evidence. 
"It is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the creditability 
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of the evidence." Holbrook Co. v. 
Adams, 542 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975). Paula concluded after witnessing Neil's fall that the 
rocks were the cause of her husband's fall. (Exhibit "D;" page 15, lines 14-18). The only 
way summary judgment can be affirmed is if this evidence is disregarded or deemed not 
credible. The purpose of summary judgment is "to eliminate the time, trouble, and expense 
of trial when upon any view taken of the facts asserted by the party ruled against, he would 
not be entitled to prevail. Holbrook Co.. 542 P.2d at 193. Summary judgment should not be 
used "to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact." IdL Affirming the 
grant of summary judgment for ZZYZX would require weighing the evidence and the 




It is not disputed that Neil was seriously injured as a result of his fall. Neil dislocated 
both shoulders and compound fractured his left wrist. (Exhibit "F;" page 30, lines 20-22 and 
page 35, lines 2-4). Neil has incurred medical bills and was unable to work for five weeks 
and Paula was unable to work for two weeks as a result of his fall. (Exhibit "F;" page 46, 
lines 12-15 and page 51, lines 20-23). Therefore summary judgment is not appropriate on 
the element of damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The grant of summary judgment by the trial court was erroneous. The Defendant 
ZZYZX is liable for creating a permanent hazard. Affidavits and depositions establish that 
the permanent rock landscaping adjacent to the sidewalk where the Plaintiff Neil Hone fell 
was a reasonably foreseeable hazard that was inherently dangerous if not properly 
maintained. The evidence establishes that the only reasonable inference is that Neil slipped 
upon rocks on ZZYZX's sidewalk. Every element of Neil's negligence claim has been 
buttressed by more than minimal evidence required to preclude summary judgment. Neil 
Hone respectfully requests a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
ZZYZX against his claims. 
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DATED and SIGNED t h i s / / '^ t iay of July, 2003. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
?•, /^J^e* 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the original Appellant's Brief was hand delivered to the Clerk of 
the Court, in the Utah Court of Appeals and a copy mailed to the below named parties by 
placing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this // "clay of July, 2003, 
addressed as follows: 
Scott W. Christensen 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum 
is included herewith. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
M. DAYLE JEFFS, #G1655 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S 
FRESH MEX, and JOHN DOES I 
THROUGH V, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 010401654 
Division No. 7 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, Neil D. Hone, by and through counsel 
of record, M. Dayle Jeffs, of the law firm of Jeffs & Jeffs, P.C, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court 
the final Order granting Defendant, ZZYXZ Management Group's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and dismissal of the action by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen entered in this matter on the 6th day 
of January 2003. This appeal is taken from the entire judgment, 
DATED and SIGNED this j ^ T d a y of January, 2003. 
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UTAH r ~ 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
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Ryan McMillan * October 25, 2001 9 
building at that time? 
A. The exterior seemed new and everything seemed 
in order when ,1 had got there. 
Q. Was the landscaping all in? 
A. The landscaping was completed except for some 
grass that hadn't''been planted on the north side of the 
building. 
Q. Do you recall during the period of January of 
2000 who was responsible for maintenance duties in the 
building, inside the building? 
A. Inside the building? As far as what type of 
maintenance? 
Q. Floor maintenance, etc. 
A. During each of the shifts it was the 
responsibility of the respective parties. If it was in 
the kitchen the cooks would be responsible for keeping 
the floors cleaned and in order and in the dining room 
area it was the busser's responsibility to do the same. 
Q. What about the exterior maintenance of the 
grounds, sidewalks, so forth? 
A. As each manager came in for their shift it was 
part of our daily walk-through to visually inspect the 
exterior walkways, pathways for cleanliness and things 
that might be of harm. Just general order. 
Qr Did they have parking places for employees 
Ryan McMillan * October 25, 2001 10 
separate from the clientele? 
A. Yes, we did. We were told we had to park in 
the rear of the building. 
Q. So that if you were coming on shift, you would 
park in the rear of the building and then approach the 
entry of the building from the rear? 
A; Most oftentimes we would go in the rear of the 
building and then get settled and then walk around and 
do those inspections. 
Q. At the time of January 17th of 2000, what were 
your specific responsibilities at that Chevy's? 
A. ThB^pn^cningl n^ d-^ p.ened^ h^e^ res^ raur^ nr^ -~a-t 
.roughly—8-rtro~"arrrrrr I was the kitchen manager for the day 
so I didn't have much to do with any of the guests. I 
was in charge of the cooks, making sure the food was 
prepared and that sort of thing. So as far as 
clientele, I really didn't do much with the clientele 
that day. 
Q. And you say you were the kitchen manager? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. Now, how many cooks would they have there on 
that morning shift? 
A. That morning shift, four, and a busser, I 
believe, because it was a Sunday, if I recall correctly. 
Q. And four cooks. Do you recall who they were 
Ryan McMillan * October 25, 2001 12 
1 Q. (BY MR. JEFFS) Yes, I do. 
2 A, His responsibilities were to make sure that 
3 the guest relations were there, that peop]e were getting 
4 served in a prompt and customer service, a happy manner, 
5 a friendly manner, that all tl le servers had shown i :i p in 
6 uniform, and, that <the general operations of it was 
7 flowing. 
P I Q. Who would have responsibility over the two of 
















A. I was the senior member of the Chevy fs 
management team there that day. 
Q. Who would have had responsibility to police 
the area outside, check it? 
A. Me . 
Q. And do you recall doing so? 
A. That morni-ng I don't recall. 
Q. What shift hours did you have? 
A. That day my shift ran from roughly 8:00 in the 
dMm^ . t/:oop.r*. 
poising until usually around 4-r-e-fr i*3~~the dfTgrrroon. 
Q. And tl len another shift would 1: .ake over? 
A. Yes. A night manager would come on and 
relieve rue of duty. 
Q. Were you there at the time that the accident 
tl lat: Neil Hone had took place? 




M. DAYLE JEFFS, #G1655 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S 
FRESH MEX, and JOHN DOES I 
THROUGH V, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAULA A. HONE 
Civil No. 010401654 
Division No. 7 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Paula A. Hone, being first duly sworn upon her oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. I have first hand knowledge ai - - • .• •>•(. .. i ng facts. 
2. I witnessed by husband, Neil D. Hone, fall near the entrance of Chevy's Fresh Mex 
Restaur h on January 17, 2000. 
3. At the time my husband fell, I was walking at his side. 
4. Immediately after my husband fell, I noticed small rocks on the ground in the same 
area where he had fallen. 
5. Immediately after my husband fell, I removed the small rocks from the area where 
my husband fell by brushing the rocks aside with my foot. 
6. 1 brushed the small rocks aside with my foot out of concern that others might fall in 
a manner similar to my husband. 
7. Al a later date, I returned to the area where my husband fell and observed that small 
rocks of the same type I saw on the day my husband fell were scattered across the area where my 
husband fell. 
8. I gathered some of these rocks; a photograph of these rocks is attached to this 
affidavit as exhibit " 1 . " The rocks photographed in exhibit " 1 " are the exact type of rock I saw on 
the ground at tlle time and place that my husband fell. 
9. I have returned to the premises several times since January 17, 2000. 
10. Each time I have returned I have observed rocks, pebbles, and other materials on the 
walkways 
11. Attached as Exhibit "2" are pictures showing rocks and pebbles. 
12. Exhibit "3" are pictures showing a pile of ro =«.:; u.jacent to the walkways. 
13. Exhibit "4" are pictures of a pile of landscaping material next to the walkway. 
2 
14. Exhibit "5" are pictures of the planted areas showing interspersed small rocks in the 
area near where Neil fell. 
15. Exhibit "6" are pictures showing materials extending fn • \; • > .1 areas onto the 
walkway. 
16 On each of the several times I have been on the site, there has been materials on the 
walkway showing a pattern of failing to keep the area free of materials 1 lazardoi is to people on the 
walkway. ^* 
DATED and SIGNED this / day of August, 2002. 
^aA^ <\ ]^r^ 
Paula A. Hone 
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Did your wife have tc work that day? 
Yes, she did. 
I assume that you waized until she got home 
ere you and your son tcok her out -- went out 
to eat. 
Yes. 
What time did she arrive that day, do you 
I think she got home about 4:30, maybe a 
ittle before. 
Is that about right? 
I'll be asking her sc --
Okay. 
Had you been to the Chevy's restaurant before 
? 
No. 
This was your first time there? 
Yes. 
Do you know whether your son or your wife had 
that restaurant before? 
No, they had not. 
Why don't you describe for me -- I assume 
suggested that as a reasonable place to go. 
We had got --at the tailgating party at BYTJ 
before we had got some coupons and when my sen 
18 
Q. I assume both of these preceded the accident. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did either the artificial hip or the 
artificial knee result in any problems with stability? Did 
you have any problems with falling or --
A. Nc. 
Q. -- or difficulties? 
A> Nc. 
Q. I guess the reason I'm asking is since this 
lawsuit revolves around a fall that you had, had you 
suffered other prior falls before this accident that were 
serious enough that it required you to get medical care? 
A. Let's see. I can't think of any at this 
time. 
Q. I'm not talking about something where you 
might have, you know, simply stumbled and gone to your knee; 
I am more concerned about a fall that would have been -- you 
suffered some injury and -- not just a scuffed knee or 
something like that, but an injury that was significant 
enough to you that you felt like it was appropriate to go 
see a doctor to be checked out. 
A. Like I say, I can't. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I can't remember any, ycu know. 
Q. All right. 
21 
1 A. You know, once in awhile you'll slip on ice, 
2 but, I mean, I've --
3 Q. I'm not concerned about those kinds of falls. 
4 As I have tried to explain before, I am talking about 
5 something not where you simply lost your balance but where 
6 you were injured, you suffered some kind of an injury, at 
7 least enough that, you know, you couldn't just put a 
8 Band-Aid on it but go see a doctor. 
9 A. Not that Z can recall. 
10 Q. What kind of car were you driving at the time 
11 of the accident? 
12 A. It is an Oldsmobile Intrigue. 
13 Q. When you arrived at the restaurant do you 
14 recall about what time of day it was? 
15 A. It was a little before 5. I'm not sure. 
16 Q. Do you recall what the lighting conditions 
17 were like? 
18 A. It was, you know, dusk. It wasn't dark. You 
19 could see. 
20 Q. Was the sun below the horizon, do you recall? 
21 A. I don't recall whether... 
22 Q. Was the weather such that -- what was the 
23 weather, do you recall? 
24 A. It had been raining basically most of the 



























Q. And if I understand you correctly, you had 
already gone west on the sidewalk, turned north and gone 
north on the sidewalk, and had you turned or were you 






















east when you lost your balance? 
I had turned. 
How close were you to the south edge of that 
you lost your balance and fell? 
I don't recollect. I would say maybe a foot 
a-half. My son was on the -- you know, he 
of to the side of me and a little bit behind 
So the right side of you? 
Yes. 
What were you wearing by way of footwear at 
I had some, oh, dress slip-on shoes. I have 
pair on today, in fact. 
Do you typically wear glasses or contact 
No. 
Had you taken a step or two, is that what: I 
to say, before the fall occurred? 
Yes. Yes. 
Did you see what it was that you fell on? 
No. 
Mr. Jeffs: Before the accident? 
Q. (By Mr. Christensen) That caused you to 
fall? At the time ycu lost your balance, a: the time you 
fell, did you know what caused your fall? 
A. No. 
Q. As you sit here today, can ycu tell me how 
the fall occurred? In other words, did your foot slip, you 
know, which foot? Does that make sense? I know that's kind 
of a hard question, bur, for example, when you slip on ice, 
you know, that example that you used before, sometimes you 
can tell that, you knew, your foot slipped out to the side 
or slipped in front of you, it was your right foot or your 
left foot. Can you provide that kind of detail about the 
fall? 
A. I believe it was my right foot and it felt 
like there was something, you know, under it, but, like I 
say... 
Q. Did your foot move one direction or the other 
as you stepped onto the right foot? 
A. It just more likely slid backwards. I'm not 
sure . 
Q. This is important enough I don't want you to 
guess, but if the impression that you have, if you have an 
impression as to what direction, if any, your foot moved 
25 jwhen you fell or when you slipped, I would like to know 
27 
that. But if 













didn't get it 
Q. 
A. 







you are just guessing, that probably doesn't 
.e lot. With that warning, do you have some 
are you just guessing? 
It didn't feel like it went to the side. 
As your right foot slipped, what happened 
I tried catching my balance and didn't 
Did you have anything in your hands at the 
No, I did not. ! 
What did you do to try to catch your balance? 
something about your wife grabbing for you. ! 
Well, she tried grabbing my coat but she 
Okay. 
And, you know, just -- evidently I must have 
some way because I dislocated both shoulders. 
Do you have a memory of what happened in the 
Not really. 
I understand that --
I was up and then I was down. I mean... 
When you were on the ground did you fall --





When ycu were on the ground did you realize 












I knew ir.y -- both shoulders were hurting. 
















On your forehead? 
Yes. 
That's where you -- as I told you, 
Yes, on ~he forehead. 
Sometimes gestures don't come across very 
a scrape or an abrasion, something like that, 
ad? Were there any marks? 
Yes. 
Your head hurt? 
I can't recall at that -- I was in so much 
You mentioned your shoulders hurt and I 
that you fractured your left wrist, broke your 
in this fall. 
Yes. 
I assume that was painful to you also. i 
Yes. I -- I noticed the shoulders more than | 
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how you were 
A. 
No. 
You didn't see anything 
thac must have been what 
Yes. 
Other than your wife an 
in the immediate vicinity 
I don't believe so but. 
Did anyone else come an 
doing when you were there 
I believe someone that 
going into the restaurant went in and 






needed to call the ambula 
out of my... 
Left wrist? 
Yeah. 
Do you recall speaking 
individual associated with Chevy's the 
A. 
Q. 
Very briefly. I mean.. 
I assume they came out 
doing, is there anything we can do to 
thing. 
ad caused you to fall? 
there that led you to 
I tripped on, is that 
d your son, was there 
chat saw your 
a speak to you or see 
on the ground? | 
was either leaving or 
chen someone from the 
cold them that she 
nee. She noticed the 
with any employee or 
re at the scene? 
• 
and said, how are you 












I understood that they were able 
right shoulder back into its socket withcut any 
[ you 
to get the ; 
kind of -- \ 



















I assume. I was out. 
They didn't have to make any 
) your shoulder? 
No, they didn't have to make 
of the snoulders. 
1 
incisions or do 1 
any 
Had you had any prior problems wi 
incisions on ; 
_th your 
any kind of chronic problems, arthritis, anything 
Pardon? 
Like arthritis, anything like that? 
No, not that I... 
Had either shoulder ever been dislocated 
No. 
I assume that you hadn't had 
either before. 
No. 






Q. Same question with your s: 





as a re 
of the 
A. 
moulders, right or i 
/e had 
problems with your shoulders? 
Like a lot of times when ; 
can't lift stuff. I have to have 
Q. I guess you are able to 1. 







(Witness nods head.) 
Is that a yes? 
Yes. 
Do you know how much time 
this accident? 
I believe it was five wee] 
I' m wo: 
i 
to abandon j 
irking in the j 
my son or Paula | 
ift but just not 
from " 
ks, po 
might have been a little -- you know, five-and 
doctor 
he also 
would not let me drive the car fo 
said I 
r five 
wouldn't be able to get in the 









Do you recall what your p 
accident? In other words, you've 
What does that equate to dollar-
A. 
I could 




work you lost j 
ssibly it 
-a-half. The 
weeks. And ! 
van because I 
at the time 
ive to six 
the gross or the 
tell you approximately what my net was. 
46 
that correct? 
A. Correct, yes. 
Q. Has anyone told you that they saw anything on 
that sidewalk on the west side near ~he entrance of Chevy's? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you suffered from any other problems 
which you believe were the result of the fall? That's 
really broad and I understand it's broad, but we have talked 
about your --we have talked about zhe problems with your 
wrist and both of your shoulders, the abrasion on your 
forehead. Are there any other problems that you believe ycu 
have suffered from or are suffering from that are the result 
of the injuries that you received in this accident, 
emotional consequences, you know, anything like that? 
A. Well, I know it did put a stress on the two 
of us for awhile. 
Q. You and your wife? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because of what? 
A. Well, she had to take time off work. I had 
my arms -- for two weeks I had both arms strapped to me. I 
could not use either one of my arms. She had to do 
everything, including bathe me, feed me. 
Q. Obviously there were some additional 
requirements on her while you were in the healing process. 
51 
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Q. While you may not: have an exact figure, can 
you give me an estimate as to how much time you stayed home 
with him? Is it two weeks, three weeks, something in that 
range? 
A. Approximately two weeks. 
Q. Did you work a full 40-hour week typically? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was overtime an issue? Was that something 
that was required or did they not want you to do it? 
A. Only in case of emergencies. 
Q. The reason I'm asking is, I am just trying to 
get a sense for the economic consequences to you of your 
husband's injuries. It sounds like you lost five and a 
quarter an hour for 4 0 hours a week for approximately two 
weeks. Is that fair? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, I'd like to draw your attention to the 
date of this accident, January 17th. That was the day that 
you were working, even though your husband was off that day, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall what time you arrived heme that 
day? 
A. About 10 to 5. 
EXHIBIT "G" 
1 Q. Now, your husband testified that he was a 
2 step or two moving towards the east when he fell. Is zhat 
3 your recollection also? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And when your husband -- say just the moment 
6 before he fell, where would you position yourself in 
7 reference to him? 
8 A. On his left side, maybe one foot behind him. 
9 Q. How far to his lefr? 
10 A. A couple feet. 
11 Q. You weren't holding hands or he didn't have 
12 your arm or you didn't have his arm? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Where do you recall your son being? 
15 A. On the right side of him, two, two and a half 
16 feet back. 
17 Q. Now, had your son -- if you know, had your 
18 son turned -- was he heading eas~bound also when your 
19 husband fell? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. What was your first: indication that there was 
22 a problem that day? 
23 A. When he started leaning forward more tc --
24 like he was going to fall. 
25 Q. So was it a sudden movement, like a pitching 
forward? 
A. It -
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Is that correct? j 
Yes. | 
Now, did you ever look down at your husband's ! 






Mr. Jeffs: You mean while he was falling? 
Mr. Christensen: Yes. 
She reached for him and I am wondering, as he i 
did you see anything that led you to believe | 
he had fallen on? j 
Not ~hat I can think of at this time. 
Let r.e ask you the same question but expand 
the time frame. 
anything on 
While you were there, at any time did you see 
that sidewalk that led you to believe that you 
had seen what caused your husband to fall? 
It. There was some very small rocks that had 





When you say --
Very small rocks. 
Small is kind of tough. You know what pea 
Or maybe that's a bad -- okay. If you were to 
use, say, someone's fingernails as the size, was it the size 
of your little fingernail, the size of your thumbnail? Do 
you see what I mean? Is there some way you could describe 
15 
1 wrist and said, oh, my goodness, he has broker, his wrist? 
2 1 A. No. 
3 Q. Once ycu initially talked with your husband 
4 what did you do then? 
5 A. The guys from the restaurant came out and 
6 said that they would dial 911. They called -he paramedics. 
7 They brought out a booster seat and something to put 
8 I underneath his head and feet. And I went to ihe car and got 
9 a blanket and laid over him. 
10 Q. At any ~ime did you have any discussions with 
11 your husband at the scene of the accident about how the fall 
12 I occurred? 
13 A. He said that he felt that there was something 
14 under his feet. 
15 Q. Is that when you started looking around? 
16 -A. Yes. 
17 Q. How long was that after the fall? 
18 A. Just a couple minutes. 
19 Q. Were there other people gathered around at 
20 that point? 
21 A. There was a couple that had came out from the 
22 restaurant. 
23 | Q. And then at least one employee from the 
24 |restaurant? 
25 A. Yes. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S 
FRESH MEX, and JOHN DOES I 
THROUGH V, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT O* DUSTIN 1HOMAS 
HONE 
Civil No. 010401654 
Division No. 7 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
Dustin Thomas Hone, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am 17 years of age and was personally present and observed the events set forth in 
this Affidavit. 
EXHIBIT "H" 
2. On January 17,2000,1 accompanied my parents to the Chevy's Fresh Mex restaurant 
in Orem, Utah. 
3. We arrived past dusk and it had rained. We parked on the opposite side of the 
building from the entrance and walked on the walkway around the building. 
4. I was walking about 3 feet behind my parents and they were walking side by side at 
a normal pace, not fast. 
5. I saw my father fall and try to catch himself as he fell to the sidewalk. He hit his head 
into the wall of the restaurant and then down onto the sidewalk. 
6. We rushed to his side and determined that he appeared to be quite badly hurt and was 
unable to get up. A couple came up the outside stairs from the parking lot and stopped briefly where 
we were and then went on into the building. Someone came out from the building, but I do not know 
who that was. 
7. I went to the car and got a blanket to put on my father while we were waiting for the 
ambulance. He was never able to get up off the laying down position. 
8. The ambulance arrived in about five to ten minutes and then they rolled him over onto 
a stretcher and took him in the ambulance. 
9. While we were there, I observed what appeared to be some pea gravel scattered on 
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Based on this recorded climatological data, the "worst case" runoff event was 
0.05 inches over a 24-hour period on January 17th. From a comparative 
standpoint, this amount of runoff is insignificant (ie, too small to be reflected on 
storm event. This is particularly true given the expected infiltration rates of the 
soils typical to the area. The soils typical to the site are classified as hydrologic 
"Group C". For this type of soil, the expected initial loss due to wetting and 
infiltration is 0.75 inches in the first hour and 0.25 inches per hour thereafter. In 
other words, the magnitude of storm event recorded on January 17, 2000 would 
not result in any runoff per se\ 
3. Magnitude of Runoff Required to move Rocks onto the Sidewalk: 
inspection of the site revealed only rocks 
associated with the planters immediately 
adjacent to the entry sidewalk area. These 
planters had rocks approximately 6-inches in 
average diameter. 
An 
Typical Rocks in Planters 
Various studies have been 
conducted to ascertain the required 
riprap (rock) sizing for armoring 
stream and drainage channels. The 
report entitled "Development of 
Riprap Design Criteria by Riprap 
Testing in Flumes " prepared by 
Colorado State University for the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1987 was consulted for the purposes of 






IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL D. HONE and PAULA A. HONE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ZZXYZ MANAGEMENT GROUP, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, dba CHEVY'S 
FRESH MEX, and JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 010401654 
Date: November 26, 2002 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is Defendant's Motions for summary Judgement as to PlaintiflFNeil Hone 
and Plaintiff Paula Hone. The Court, having heard oral arguments and considered all relevant 
memorandum, now makes the following decision: 
Facts 
1. On January 17, 2000, Plaintiffs Neil and Paula Hone arrived with their son, Dustin, at 
Chevy's Fresh Mex restaurant in Orem a little before 5:00 p.m. 
2. As the three of them walked to the entrance to the restaurant, Neil noticed some "pea 
gravel" on the sidewalk south of the building, but he did not have trouble walking through 
that area. 
3. As Neil neared the entrance, he fell. He does not know what caused him to fall. Paula 
claims that she saw some "very small rocks" on the sidewalk near the scene of the fall but 
has no personal knowledge as to the cause of the fall. 
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EXHIBIT "J" 
4. Aside from Paula's claim, no one at or near the scene saw anything on the sidewalk that 
could have caused the fall. It had rained that day, but the sidewalks were only damp, and 
there were no standing puddles of water. 
5. As a result of the fall, Neil suffered injury to his face, head, left arm, and right shoulder. 
Plaintiff Neil Hone seeks medical bills, lost earning capacity, pain, suffering, emotional 
and mental distress. Paula Hone seeks loss of consortium. 
6. Prior to submitting this motion, both parties conducted significant discovery of regarding 
possible causes of the incident. 
Analysis 
Summary Judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. U.R.C.P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). In order to establish a prima facia case for negligence 
Utah courts have held that the proponent must show, "(1) a duty of reasonable care extending to 
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and actual causation of te injury; and (4) damages 
suffered by plaintiff." Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598, 600-601 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). To prevail each element must be independently proven. 
Duty 
It is well accepted in Utah that a business owner owes a duty of care to its invitees to keep 
its premises safe and warn of know dangers. Black v. Nelson, 532 P.2d 212 (Utah 1975). 
Breach 
In cases involving unsafe conditions upon the premises of a business, the Utah Supreme 
Court has analyzed facts in two different categories: 
The first involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a 
slippery substance on the floor and usually where it is not known how it got there. 
In this class of cases it is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the 
defendant so that liability results therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that 
he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or 
-2-
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that he 
should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, 
such as: in the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or 
machinery, or its manner of use, which was created or chosen by the defendant (or 
his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such circumstances, where the 
defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed to 
know of the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary. Allen v. 
Federated airy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975) 
The parties have briefed, argued, and conducted considerable discovery regarding this 
issue. The Defendants argues that, as a matter of law, they did not breach any duty to keep the 
premises safe. They claim that there is no evidence that Chevy's had any knowledge of an unsafe 
condition of a temporary nature on the day and time of the accident or that it had sufficient time 
to remedy the alleged unsafe condition with the exercise of reasonable care. Chevy's also 
conducted considerable discovery regarding the character of the landscape, arguing that the rocks 
themselves did not create a permanent unsafe condition. 
Plaintiffs present the affidavit of Paula Hone in order to establish that, at the time of the 
fall, there was small gravel of the defendants' sidewalk in the area where the fall occurred. They 
argue that this creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Defendants were in 
breach of their duty of care. Plaintiffs argue that this gravel was not put there by a third party, but 
was a permanent unsafe condition created by the character of the landscape, and thus Chevy's 
was on notice of the danger. 
The Court agrees that the affidavit of Paula Hone presents an issue of fact as to whether 
or Chevy's knew or should have know that the rocks were on the sidewalk and an unsafe 
condition existed. Thus a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not the gravel was 
present, whether that presence created an unsafe condition of a permanent nature, and whether 
that presence constituted a breach of the duty of care.. 
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Causation 
The law dictates that when the proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim 
fails as a matter of law." Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 132 P.2d 680 (Utah 1943). In 
Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), a woman fell for an 
unknown reason. AflBrming the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Court of 
Appeals said that since the cause was unknown and no "further investigation is apt to reveal the 
cause" of Plaintiffs fall, the Plaintiff "failed to raise any material issue of fact beyond a 'bare 
contention that [the Defendant] was somehow negligent." 
Here Plaintiff Paula Hone only saw the rocks after the fall. No evidence has been 
presented that the rocks were the cause of the fall, simply a 'bare contention' made that they 
could be the cause. Neil Hone himself does not know what caused him to fall. The Court 
therefore concludes that further investigation will not reveal the cause of the fall and thus the 
claim fails as a matter of law. 
Conclusion 
Although there are material issues created by the Affidavit of Paula Hone as to the breach 
of Chevy's Fresh Mex to maintain a safe premises for its invitees, Plaintiffs have failed to establish 
a showing of proximate cause and thus a prima facia case for negligence, the claims must 
therefore fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants entitled to judgement as a matter of 
law. The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment as to both Neil 
and Paula Hone. 
DATED this 10 day of _ ,<2002 
BY THE COURT 
STEVEN L 
tfJUSSOa,. 
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